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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of political liberalisation on …nancial
development in two steps. First, the paper examines whether political
liberalisation in terms of institutional improvement promotes …nancial
development, using a panel dataset of 90 developed and developing
countries over 1960-99. The empirical evidence reveals a positive ef-
fect on …nancial development at least in the short-run, particularly for
lower-income countries, ethnically divided countries and French legal
origin countries. In the second part of the paper, a before-after event
study approach is used to explore the impact of democratic transitions
on …nancial development. It indicates that a democratic transforma-
tion is typically followed by an increase in …nancial development.
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11 Introduction
A considerable increase in …nancial development during 1980-2000 has been
an important economic feature in many developing countries. The average
ratio of private credit to GDP increased from 23% in 1980 to 32% in 2000.
The average ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP rose from 32% in 1980 to 42% in
2000. On the political front, between 1980 and 2000 there were 62 developing
countries undertaking signi…cant political reforms towards democracies1. Do
the above economic and political events in the developing world interact in
important ways?
There has been relatively little work on the impact of political liberali-
sation on …nancial development, but much work on the correlation between
political liberalisation and economic growth. The existing research in this
…eld does not unanimously establish the consequences of political liberal-
isation for economic development. Instead, it is made up of one line of
research supporting positive consequences, another line stressing negative
consequences and some maintaining ambiguous views. Given the diverging
arguments as to the e¤ect of democratisation, this paper aims to investigate
whether political liberalisation in terms of institutional development has any
impact on the speed of …nancial development. How does democratization
in‡uence …nancial development in countries with low GDP per capita, high
ethnic and religious divisions or speci…c legal origins?
The importance of political liberalisation for …nancial development has
been implicitly indicated by Clague et al. (1996) and Olsen (1993). These
authors argue that, in comparison to autocracies, democracies better fa-
cilitate property rights protection and contract enforcement, encouraging
investment directly. The crucial role of the e¢ciency of legal and regula-
tory system involving property rights protection, contract enforcement and
accounting practices in determining …nancial development has been empha-
sized by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Mayer and Sussman (2001).
1Countries are considered as experiencing a political transition when either their
“polity2” scores in the PolityIV Database by Marshall et al. (2003) change from neg-
ative values to positive values or their “freedom” indices, de…ned in this paper from the
Freedom House Country Survey (2003), change from “Not Free” to “Free” or “Partly
Free”.
2The signi…cance of this study is re‡ected in recent research on the po-
litical economy of …nancial development. Pagano and Volpin (2001) argue
that self-interested policy makers may intervene in …nancial markets due to
their career concerns or group interests. To some extent, the level of …nan-
cial development is the outcome of speci…c political bargaining or political
intervention. Rajan and Zingales (2003)’s interest groups theory of …nancial
development suggests that dominant interest groups, especially incumbent
…rms and incumbent …nancial intermediaries, have strong incentives to pre-
vent new companies from entering, potentially blocking the development of
a more advanced …nancial market. Beck et al. (2003)’s application of the
settler mortality hypothesis by Acemoglu et al. (2001) to …nancial develop-
ment suggests that the institutions established by the extractive colonizers
are likely to be detrimental to …nancial development, while the institutions
created by the settler colonizers tend to favour …nancial development.
Arguably, countries controlled by elite groups are more inclined to pro-
tect the interests of elite from the bulk of society, restrict participation in
the political system and so on. The more power held by the elite groups,
the more autocratic the system, the more obstacles for …nancial develop-
ment. This tends to suggest that political liberalisation intending to limit
the in‡uence of elite group over policy making, widen su¤rage in the po-
litical system, and respect basic political rights and civil liberties could be
critical for …nancial development.
To study whether political liberalisation promotes …nanical development,
this research employs two methods. One is a dynamic panel data study, fo-
cusing on 90 developed and developing countries, to analyse the e¤ect of
political liberalisation in terms of institutional improvement on …nancial
development. The countries included are those undertaking some politi-
cal reforms to improve institutional quality, but not necessarily experienc-
ing a democratic transition over 1960-99. The bias-corrected Least Square
Dummy Variable estimate proposed by Kiviet (1995) and recently devel-
oped by Bruno (2005) is the central method of this study and compared
with the system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998).
The second part of this paper moves on to study probably the most
3important institutional change, namely political transformation from an au-
tocratic regime to a democratic regime. It studies the e¤ect of the establish-
ment of a representative government on …nancial development for 33 coun-
tries that underwent a democratic transformation during 1960-2000 subject
to data availability for …nancial development. By using a before-and-after
comparison, this exercise examines the responses of the level of …nancial
development and the volatility of …nancial development after a regime tran-
sition.
This paper shows that improved institutional quality is associated with
increases in …nancial development at least in the short run, especially for
lower income countries, ethnically divided and French legal origin countries.
The before and after event study also indicates that in general democratic
transitions are typically preceded by low …nancial development, but fol-
lowed by a short-run boost in …nancial development and greater volatility of
…nancial development. The …ndings of this research underline the in‡uence
of political liberalisation over the supply side of …nance and shed light on the
strong and robust relationship between institutional quality and economic
performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief
review of the literature on institutions, democratisation and …nance. Sec-
tion 3 describes the measures that are used for political liberalisation and
…nancial development. Section 4 analyses whether institutional improve-
ment stimulates …nancial development. The empirical results are presented
following a description of dynamic panel data methods. Section 5 turns to
investigate the link between democratic transitions and …nancial develop-
ment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutions, democratisation and …nance
This section brie‡y outlines the theoretical background and motivation of
this research. It discusses the role of institutions in …nancial development
and the possible links between democratization and …nance.
Research on the role of institutions in …nancial development has been
substantial, especially research on the e¤ects of the legal and regulatory en-
4vironment on the functioning of …nancial markets. A legal and regulatory
system involving protection of property rights, contract enforcement and
good accounting practices has been identi…ed as essential for …nancial de-
velopment. Most prominently, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have argued that
the origins of the legal code substantially in‡uence the treatment of cred-
itors and shareholders, and the e¢ciency of contract enforcement. They
document that countries with a legal code like Common Law tend to pro-
tect private property owners, while countries with a legal code like Civil
Law tend to care more about the rights of state and less about the rights
of the masses. Countries with French legal origins are said to have com-
paratively ine¢cient contract enforcement and more corruption, and less
well-developed …nancial systems, while countries with British legal origins
enjoy higher levels of …nancial development. Among others, Mayer and Suss-
man (2001) emphasize that regulations concerning information disclosure,
accounting standards, permissible practices of banks, and deposit insurance
do appear to have material e¤ects on …nancial development.
Beck et al. (2003)’s application of the settler mortality hypothesis due
to Acemoglu et al. (2001) to …nancial development is another signi…cant
work in this context. They argue that the extractive colonizers associated
with an inhospitable environment aim to establish institutions that privilege
the small elite group and potentially ignore private property rights, while
the settler colonizers in more favorable environments are more likely to cre-
ate institutions that support private property and balance the power of the
state. Accordingly, institutions in the extractive environment tend to block
…nancial development, while those in setter colonies are more conducive to
…nancial development. Both the legal origin theory of La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) and Beck et al. (2003)’s application are related to colonisation, but the
former is more concerned with how colonisation is re‡ected in national ap-
proaches over property rights and …nancial development, whereas the latter
provides a mechanism for how colonisation in‡uences …nancial development
through institutional development, and contributes to the political economy
literature from a historical point of view.
The recently developed “new political economy” approach regards “reg-
ulation and its enforcement as a result of the balance of power between
5social and economic constituencies” (Pagano and Volpin, 2001). It cen-
tres on self-interested policy makers who can intervene in …nancial markets
either through overall regulation or individual cases for purposes such as
career concerns and the promotion of group interests. Rajan and Zingales
(2003) emphasize the role of interest groups, the incumbent industrial …rms
and the domestic …nancial sector, on …nancial development. They argue
that incumbents have strong incentives to block the development of a more
transparent and competitive …nancial sector, although these incentives may
be weakened by openness to external trade and international ‡ows of capital.
It seems that political liberalisation intending to remove institutional
obstacles and enhance institutional e¢ciency is bene…cial to economic devel-
opment. However, much research undertaken to study the e¤ect of political
liberalisation on economic performance is associated with substantial contro-
versies. Some argue that the democratic process enhances fundamental civil
liberties, stable politics and an open society; promotes property rights pro-
tection and contract enforcement; discourages corruption and lawlessness,
and fosters economic growth (Olsen, 1993; Clague et al., 1996; Minier, 1998;
Persson, 2005). On the contrary, under pressures from di¤erent interest
groups democratic structures may su¤er from ine¢ciency in decision-making
and di¢culty in implementing viable policies for rapid growth. “Premature"
democracy in developing countries possibly lowers the economic growth rate,
and even results in economic disorder, political instability and ethnic con‡ict
(Persson and Tabellini, 1992; and Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000). Tavares
and Wacziarg (2001) show that “the overall e¤ect of democracy on economic
growth is moderately negative” - an increase in human capital accumulation
is o¤set by a decrease in physical capital accumulation in the process of
democratisation.
The possible links between political liberalisation and …nancial devel-
opment have been implicitly studied in the above works, especially Olsen
(1993) and Clague et al. (1996). However, research directly exploring the
impact of political liberalisation on …nancial development has been lacking.
This research might contribute to our understanding of the structural de-
terminants of …nanical development. Looking at this issue is also signi…cant
for examining whether political liberalisation contributes to an improved
6investment climate. This is because commonly-used …nancial development
indicators such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and the ratio of credit
issued to the private sector to GDP are generally forward-looking - better
…nancial development is then an early indication of a better investment en-
vironment.
3 The measures and data
3.1 The sample
This research studies the impact of political liberalisation on …nancial devel-
opment in two steps. The …rst-stage study uses a panel of 90 non-transition
economies over the period 1960-99 with 5 observations per country. Aver-
aging data over non-overlapping, eight-year periods enables us to abstract
from business cycle in‡uences and to examine both short-run and long-run
e¤ects. The sample for this analysis excludes countries that become democ-
racies and independent following the end of the Cold War, mainly the East
European countries2. The selection of countries is based on the Polity index,
“polity2” of the PolityIV Database. To pick up any e¤ect of institutional
improvement on …nancial development, this exercise tries to incorporate all
democratic reform episodes in the sense that any increase of the annual
“polity2” score for a country will be considered even if it always remains an
autocratic regime or a democratic regime over the whole period.
The second-stage study is undertaken by using a before-and-after event
study approach on 33 democratizing countries, over the period 1960-2001.
Following the conventional procedure, a country is treated as a democracy
at any year if it has strictly positive values of the Polity indicator, “polity2”,
in the PolityIV database by Marshall et al. (2003). The selection of coun-
tries hinges on not only the “polity2” in the PolityIV Database but also
the “freedom” index, generated from the Freedom House Country Survey
(2003) discussed below. Countries having either a “polity2” score jumping
2Essentially, data prior to 1990 for these countries generated by the central planning
economy are largely incomplete, while data after 1990 are highly problematic or doubtful
since most of these countries underwent severe economic disorder for several years in the
early stage of the transformation process to a market-oriented economy.
7from a negative value to a positive value or a “freedom” index moving from
“Not Free” to “Free” or “Partly Free” will be initially selected. The study
concentrates on the countries with a democratic transformation lasting for
at least 10 years.
Information on the classi…cations of income levels, region dummies, eth-
nic fractionaliastion, legal origins is obtained from the World Bank Global
Development Network Database (GDN), 2002. The data for GDP, trade
openness, and aggregate investment are from the Penn World Table 6.1.
Data for the black market premium are from the GDN.
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the description and sources of the vari-
ables involved in the empirical analysis.
3.2 The measure and data for …nancial development
The aggregate measure of …nancial development in this context is denoted
by FD. Since there is no single aggregate index in the literature, we use
principal components analysis to produce a new aggregate index. Ideally,
the principal component analysis should be based on indicators from the
banking sector, stock market and the bond market so as to capture di¤erent
aspects of …nancial development. However, data on stock market and bond
market development is rarely available before 1975 or even later, so the
analysis focuses on …nancial intermediary development.
The measure is based on three widely-used indicators of …nancial inter-
mediary development as follows3:
1. Liquid Liabilities (LLY), calculated as the liquid liabilities of banks
and non-bank …nancial intermediaries (currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities) over GDP. It measures the size, relative to the economy,
of …nancial intermediaries including three types of …nancial institutions: the
central bank, deposit money banks and other …nancial institutions.
2. Private Credit (PRIVO), de…ned as the credit issued to the pri-
vate sector by banks and other …nancial intermediaries divided by GDP,
excluding the credit issued to government, government agencies and pub-
lic enterprises, as well as the credit issued by the monetary authority and
3The description here is mainly from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996, 1999).
8development banks. This captures general …nancial intermediary activities
provided to the private sector.
3. Commercial-Central Bank (BTOT), the ratio of commercial bank as-
sets over the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets. It proxies
the advantages of …nancial intermediaries in channelling savings to invest-
ment, monitoring …rms, exerting corporate governance and undertaking risk
management relative to the central bank.
Since these indicators are used to measure the size of the banking sys-
tem4, FD mainly captures the size of bank-based intermediation. FD is the
…rst principal component of these three indicators above and accounts for
72% of their variation. The weights from this procedure are 0.59 for Liquid
Liabilities, 0.63 for Private Credit and 0.50 for Commercial-Central Bank.
The data on these indicators are obtained from the World Bank’s Finan-
cial Structure and Economic Development Database (2005).
3.3 The data for political liberalisation
The …rst political liberalisation index is the Polity indicator “polity2” in the
PolityIV Database (Marshall et al. 2003), denoted by POLIT. It proxies
the degree of democracy and seeks to measure institutional quality based on
the freedom of su¤rage, operational constraints and balances on executives,
and respect for other basic political rights and civil liberties. It is called
the “combined polity score”, de…ned as the democracy score minus the au-
tocracy score. The democracy and autocracy scores are derived from six
authority characteristics (regulation, competitiveness and openness of exec-
utive recruitment; operational independence of chief executive or executive
constraints; and regulation and competition of participation). Based on
these criteria, each country is assigned a democracy score and an autocracy
score ranging from 0 to 10. The larger is the democracy score, the fairer
is the election of executive power, the more open is the political process
4Two measures for the e¢ciency of …nancial intermediation that are sometimes used
are Overhead Costs, the ratio of overhead costs to total bank assets, and Net Interest
Margin, the di¤erence between bank interest income and interest expenses, divided by
total assets. Due to the incompleteness of the relevant data, they are not included in this
analysis.
9and the higher the extent of the constraints on executive power. On the
contrary, a larger autocracy score re‡ects a less open political process in a
country in terms of less competitiveness and fairness in election, narrower
participation and fewer contraints on execution.
The second index of political liberalisation is the average of political
rights and civil liberties from the Freedom House Country Survey (2003),
denoted by “freedom” index. This survey assigns an annual score of political
rights and an annual score of civil liberties to each country or territory on
a scale of 1 to 7 with lower values indicating a higher level of protection.
The average of political rights and civil liberties scores stands for the overall
freedom value for a country. The countries with an average score less than
2.5 are considered as “Free”, those with average score 2.5-5.5 are “Partly
Free”, and those having scores greater than 5.5 are treated as “Not Free”.
Since this dataset only covers the period 1972-2003, it is not used for the
panel data study, but used for selecting the democratic transition countries,
where a country is selected if its average score falls from above 5.5 to under
4.5 without reversals for at least 10 years.
Appendix Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for political liberalisa-
tion and the measure of …nancial intermediary development. Appendix Fig-
ure 1 is a scatter plot of the newly-de…ned …nancial development measure,
FD, and political liberalisation index, POLIT, showing that they are in
general positively correlated. Appendix Figure 2 plots the evolution of the
means of FD and POLIT over 1960-99. FD increases relatively gradually,
while POLIT, associated with the “Third Wave of Democratisation”, moves
upwards rapidly from the late 1970s.
4 Institutional improvement and …nancial devel-
opment
4.1 Methodology
To assess the relationship between political liberalisation and …nancial de-
velopment, the following model is estimated:
10yit = ﬁyi;t¡1 +ﬂxi;t¡1 + z
;
i;t¡1– +·i + `t +vit
i = 1;2;:::90 and t = 2:::5 (1)
Where yit is the dependent variable FD, xit is the explanatory variable
POLIT, zit is a vector of controlling variables including the logarithm of the
GDP, trade openness (OPENC), aggregate investment (CI) and the black
market premium (BMP). GDP is real GDP per capita. OPENC is the
logarithm of the trade share, the sum of exports and imports over GDP
(at current prices), divided by 100 plus one. CI is the ratio of investment
to real GDP per capita (using domestic prices), divided by 100. BMP is
the logarithm of the black market premium divided by 100 plus one. – is a
parameter vector, e.g. (–1;..–4);: · is an unobserved country-speci…c time-
invariant e¤ect and can be regarded as capturing the combined e¤ect of
all omitted variables. `t is the time e¤ect. vit is the transitory disturbance
term. The subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively.
We assume that (1) the transient errors vit are serially uncorrelated;
(2) xi; t and zi; t are potentially correlated with ·i and endogenous5. To
avoid the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables, lagged values of
xi; t and zi; t are included in the regression equation, which allows feedbacks
from the past shocks onto xi; t¡1and zi; t¡1 where the current and future re-
alisations of y do not a¤ect them. The assumption is inspired by Rodrik and
Wacziarg (2004) who argue that “democratisations tend to follow periods of
low growth rather than precede them”.
When the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique is used to estimate
this model, the OLS estimate of ﬁ is inconsistent and likely to be biased up-
wards since the lagged values of y are positively correlated with the omitted
…xed e¤ects.
The Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) method eliminates any
omitted variables bias created by the unobserved individual e¤ect by us-
ing the within-group operator and estimates the new model below by OLS:
5The series xi t is de…ned as being endogenous when xi t is correlated with vi; t and
earlier shocks, but is uncorrelated with vi t+1 and subsequent shocks. The series xi t is
strictly exogenous when xi t is uncorrelated with earlier, current and future errors. See
Bond (2002) and Arellano(2003) for details.
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Since the lagged value of y is correlated with the new error term, as
shown by Nickell (1981), the LSDV estimate of ﬁ can be badly downwards
biased for small T, even as N goes to in…nity.
The Anderson and Hsiao (1980, 1981) …rst-di¤erence Two Stage Least
Squares estimator (2SLS) wipes out the individual e¤ects by …rst di¤erencing
Equ (1) and uses the lagged value of y, x and z in t-2 as instruments for
¢yi;t¡1,¢xi;t¡1 and ¢zi;t¡1 in the …rst di¤erence equation below:
¢yit = ﬁ¢yi;t¡1 + ¢xi;t¡1ﬂ +¢z0
i;t¡1– +`t ¡ `t¡1 +¢vit
i = 1;2;:::90 and t = 3:::5 (3)
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Ahn and Schmidt (1995) point out that
the …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS estimator is consistent, but not asymptotically
e¢cient since it does not make use of all available moment conditions, nor
does it account for the di¤erenced structure of the residual disturbances
(¢vit).
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator
for dynamic panel data models which uses all lagged values of y, x and z as
instruments for ¢yi;t¡1;¢xi;t¡1 and ¢zi;t¡1 in the …rst di¤erence equation
above. The …rst di¤erencedGMM estimator is consistent and asymptotically
more e¢cient than the …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS estimator.
Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that when the autoregressive parameter
ﬁ is close to unity or the variance of the individual e¤ects (·i) increases
relative to the variance of the transient disturbances (vit) in the standard
AR(1) model, the instruments available for the …rst-di¤erenced equation
12are likely to be weak. The …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator employing these
weak instruments has been found to su¤er from …nite sample bias.
A “system GMM” estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995),
and Blundell and Bond (1998) imposes a mean stationarity assumption on
initial conditions6, which enables the lagged …rst-di¤erences of the series
(yit;xit;zit) dated t-1 to be used as instruments for the untransformed equa-
tions in levels. Based on the combination of …rst-di¤erence equations with
suitably lagged levels as instruments, and levels equations with suitably
lagged …rst-di¤erences as instruments, the system GMM estimator is ex-
pected to have much smaller …nite sample bias and greater precision in the
presence of persistent data and weak instruments for …rst di¤erences.
The asymptotic properties of these estimators depend on having a large
number of cross-section units, however. One of the main problems of using
these estimators is that they may have poor …nite sample properties in terms
of bias and imprecision. Starting from Kiviet (1995), a bias-correction of
LSDV has been developed recently for …nite samples. Kiviet (1995) derives
an approach to approximating the small sample bias of the LSDV estima-
tor and suggests that the bias approximation be evaluated at the estimates
from some consistent estimates rather than the unobserved true parameter
values, which makes bias correction operationally feasible. The Monte Carlo
evidence from Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999) and Bun and Kiviet
(2003) suggest that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) is more
e¢cient than LSDV, …rst–di¤erenced 2SLS, …rst–di¤erenced GMM and sys-
tem GMM in terms of bias and root mean square error (RMSE) for small
or moderately large samples. Bruno (2005) derives a bias approximation
of various orders in dynamic unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous
selection rule7.
This analysis compares the OLS, LSDV, LSDVC and SYS-GMM, stand-
6For the multivariate autoregressive model, Blundell and Bond (2000) show that a
su¢cient condition for the additional moment conditions to be valid is the joint mean
stationarity of all the series.
7Essentially, in the bias approximation of Bruno (2005), the within operator is adjusted
to include an exogenous selection rule which only selects the observations with observable
current and one-time lagged values, by which missing observations for some individuals
are allowed.
13ing for the system GMM estimator, for the whole sample and 3 subsamples.
The LSDVC estimator is regarded as the preferred estimator, especially for
subsamples, in which the independent variables other than the lagged de-
pendent variable are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The initial estimator
for the LSDVC could be either …rst di¤erenced GMM or SYS-GMM estima-
tor. However, the SYS-GMM is selected since the Di¤erence Sargan test of
additional moments conditions could not reject the null, and the SYS-GMM
may be a more reliable estimator than the …rst–di¤erenced GMM in this
context.
4.2 The regression results
4.2.1 Whole sample results
Table 1 presents the results for the whole sample, including estimation by
OLS, LSDV, LSVDC and SYS-GMM. For every estimate, the …rst column
is the baseline speci…cation in which the income level and trade openness are
present, while the second column controls for the black market premium and
aggregate investment. The point estimate and the approximate standard
error of the long run e¤ect for each model are reported. For the SYS-
GMM estimate, the table reports serial correlation tests, a Sargan test and
a Di¤erence Sargan test. The serial correlation tests are used to examine the
null hypothesis of no …rst-order serial correlation and no second-order serial
correlation respectively in residuals in …rst-di¤erences. Given the errors in
levels are serially uncorrelated, we would expect to …nd signi…cant …rst-
order serial correlation, but no signi…cant second-order correlation in the
…rst-di¤erenced residuals. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is
used to examine the overall validity of the instruments by comparing the
sample moment conditions with their population analogue. The Di¤erence
Sargan test, proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is used to test the
null hypothesis that the lagged di¤erences of the explanatory variables are
uncorrelated with the errors in the levels equations.
It is worth noting that, …rstly, the autoregressive parameter estimated
by LSDVC and SYS-GMM lies in the interval de…ned by the OLS levels and
LSDV estimates. Recall that, in AR(1) models, the OLS levels estimate
14of the autoregessive parameter is biased upwards in the presence of …xed
e¤ects, and the LSDV estimate is biased downwards in a short panel. A
consistent estimate of the autoregressive parameter can be expected to lie
in between the OLS levels and LSDV estimates. It is a simple indication of
the presence of serious …nite sample biases when particular estimates fail to
fall into this interval or are very close to the bounds.
Both OLS and LSDV estimates indicate a signi…cant positive e¤ect of
political liberalisation on …nancial development although they are biased
in opposite directions. The LSDVC suggests weaker evidence at the 20%
signi…cance level. The SYS-GMM estimate provides strong evidence that
the improvement in institutional quality is associated with …nancial devel-
opment, and the diagnostic tests, including the …rst-order and second-order
serial correlation tests, Sargan test and Di¤erent Sargan test, are supportive.
In general, the coe¢cients on the GDP level, trade openness and aggregate
investment are positively signed, while the coe¢cient of the black market
premium is negatively signed. The long run e¤ects in the cases of the OLS
and LSDV estimates have been found to be positive and stable, however,
the long run e¤ects for LSDVC and SYS-GMM are less precisely estimated.
In general, the table provides evidence that political liberalisation in
terms of institutional improvement is followed by advances in …nancial de-
velopment at least in the short run, which is not due to unobserved hetero-
geneity, or endogeneity biases.
4.2.2 Subsamples
One concern over the above …ndings is that these parameters may be het-
erogeneous across countries. A natural way to confront this problem is to
investigate subsamples, which are more homogeneous. We turn to three sub-
samples in this section8: lower income countries, ethnically diverse countries
and French legal origin countries. Since the cross-section dimensions of these
8The selection of these subsamples is mainly stimulated by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005)
in which low income countries, ethnically diverse countries and Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries are studied. However, I …nd no evidence in support of a positive/negative link between
political liberalisation and …nancial development for the Sub-Saharan African countries.
Experiments were also conducted for the Asian countries and Latin American countries,
again …nding no evidence.
15samples are relatively small, LSDVC is expectedto be more appropriate than
SYS-GMM for these subsamples.
Table 2 presents the results for the lower income countries, made up of
low income and lower-middle income countries, covering the majority of the
developing countries. We …nd strong evidence of a positive e¤ect of political
liberalisation on …nancial development in the short run for every estimate.
The LSDVC should be the most reliable estimate given the above discussion.
Moreover, it also indicates that the e¤ect of improved institutional quality
on …nancial development is sustained into the long run. Trade openness
positively enters the models at the 20% signi…cance level.
Table 3 shows the results for ethnically diverse countries which have a
level of ethnic fractionalisation greater than the sample median. We …nd
strong evidence of the positive e¤ect of political liberalization on …nancial
development in the short run. The autoregressive parameter estimated by
LSDVC and SYS-GMM are very close. The LSDVC estimates suggest a
positive e¤ect of political liberalization on …nancial development at the 20%
signi…cance level with GDP and trade openness entering signi…cantly. The
SYS-GMM estimates provide much stronger evidence for this e¤ect, in which
GDP and trade openness are present at the 20% signi…cance level. The long
run e¤ects and approximate standard errors are in general less precisely
estimated except for the case of the OLS and LSDV estimates.
The results for countries with French legal origin are reported in Table
4. This selection is essentially inspired by the work of La Porta et al. (1998)
which regards the legal origin as a main determinant of …nancial develop-
ment. The experiments for British legal origin group, German legal origin
group and Scandinavian legal origin group produce no evidence in favor of
such a link.
Firstly it is worth noting that the autoregressive parameter estimated by
SYS-GMM in the baseline model lies outside of the interval de…ned by the
OLS and LSDV estimates, further implying the LSDVC may be a more rea-
sonable estimator in this context. The LSDVC estimates typically show evi-
dence in support of a positive e¤ect of institutional improvement on …nancial
development for French legal origin countries at the 15% signi…cance level.
The …nding seems to be in line with La Porta et al. (1998) which claims that
16the main characteristic for countries with French legal origins is that private
property rights are generally neglected, while British legal origin countries
care more about private property owners. The …nding supports a tentative
hypothesis that democratisation in French legal origin countries tends to
change the status of private property owners in the national economy, and
is thus conducive to …nancial development.
In sum, the above studies on subsamples have produced consistent …nd-
ings: improved institutional quality lends to greater …nancial development,
at least in the short run. In the group of lower income countries, a signi…-
cant long run e¤ect is also observed. In general, we …nd the black market
premium has a negative e¤ect, while GDP, trade openness and aggregate in-
vestment enter positively. These …ndings are in accordance with Huang and
Temple (2005) on the positive e¤ect of external trade on …nancial develop-
ment and Huang (2005) who observes a positive e¤ect going from investment
to …nancial development.
5 Democratic transition and …nancial development
The previous section focuses on the broader sense of political liberalisation
in terms of institutional improvement, based on even a slight change of the
Polity index, “polity2”. This section studies the e¤ect of the establishment of
representative government on …nancial development by applying a “before-
and-after” approach to a group of countries that underwent transformation
from autocratic regimes to complete or partial democracies at some point
during 1960-2001.
The sample selection in this section relies on both the “polity2” and
“freedom" indices discussed earlier. Countries with either their “polity2”
index increasing from negative values to positive values or their “freedom”
index jumping from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” or “Free” for at least 10
years are considered for this analysis. In general, the “polity2” index and
“freedom” index yield similar results on the timing of democratic transi-
tion for most cases. However, the “polity2” index excludes small population
countries (less than half a million) and the “freedom” index is only avail-
able from 1972-73. For completeness, the selection of democratic transition
17countries combines both of them when both are available and relies on either
of them otherwise.
The event identi…cation methodology of Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2004) has been found useful for selecting the democratic transition coun-
tries, but the selection method in this analysis di¤ers from their method in
the following ways. Firstly, for simplicity this analysis selects the sample
exclusively depending on the changes from autocratic rule to democratic
regimes without any further divisions, while Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2004) divide democratisations into “full”, “partial” and “borderline” with
di¤erent thresholds in terms of either the “polity2” or the “freedom” index.
Secondly, this analysis is interested in the e¤ect of a stable regime change on
…nancial development. Hence, the sample only includes the countries whose
regime changes last for at least 10 years.
The “before-and-after” approach compares an individual country’s …-
nancial development performance under autocratic and democratic regimes.
To ease interpretation, the FD measure has been rescaled9 in Table 5. The
…ve or ten years average of FD preceding democratic transition is compared
with the mean of the FD during the …rst …ve or ten years under democracy
for 33 countries. The 10-year average of standardised FD for the sample
countries increases by 0.093 on average after the initiation of a democratic
transition and more than half of the sample countries exhibit a boost in
…nancial development. Looking at the …nancial development performance
of each individual country, we …nd enormous heterogeneity across countries,
ranging from an increase of 1.096 of a cross-country standard deviation of
FD in the 10-year average of standardised FD for Thailand to a decline
of 0.415 of a cross-country standard deviation of FD for Zambia. Korea
and Madagascar also witnessed a drastic increase in the di¤erence of 10-
year average of standardised FD, whilst Chile and Uruguay experienced a
tremendous drop in FD following their democratisation. It is worth noting
that the majority of countries that su¤ered from a dramatic drop in …nancial
development after democratisation are Latin American countries. On the
contrary, most African countries underwent a pick-up in …nancial develop-
9The FD measure has been standardised. More speci…cally, it is divided by the cross-
country standard deviation of FD in 1999.
18ment after their democratic transformation. The divergent performance in
countries’ …nancial development implies that, apart from democratisation,
the level of …nancial development in each country may be a¤ected by nu-
merous factors including macroeconomic risks and changes in the general
investment climate.
Table 5 also shows that the 5-year average of standardised FD post-
democratisation for 33 countries is larger by 0.015 cross-country standard
deviations of FD than before their democratisation, and about two-thirds
of the sample countries bene…t from this process. The mean increase is
small, but there is also considerable heterogeneity. The median values of
the increase in of standardised FD for both the 5-year and 10-year average
are positive. On average, these results tendto suggest that the establishment
of representative government is often associated with an increase in …nancial
development, but the e¤ect is only sizeable for a subset of countries.
The upper chart of Figure 1 displays the cross-country median FD 10
years before and after transitions for the whole sample. The lower chart of
Figure 1 plots the coe¢cients on the …xed e¤ect estimate of 20 time dummies
before and after democratisation to re‡ect the dynamic e¤ect of a sustained
democratisation. The regression is estimated by OLS in which the unob-
served country speci…c e¤ects, time e¤ect and controlling variables such as
trade openness, GDP, aggregate investment and black market premium are
included. The two …gures show that the sample countries in general expe-
rience a drop in FD prior to democratisation, which is in accordance with
the view that worsened economic conditions are associated with subsequent
democratisation. After democratisation, FD appears to move slightly up-
wards on average in 1-5 years, followed by a surge in 5-10 years. The charts
vividly portray the main features of FD as well as economic performance in
the process of democratisation. At the beginning of the process, democrati-
sation may produce economic chaos, political instability, ethnic con‡ict and
poor economic performance. These negative e¤ects have been observed and
emphasized by many authors. However, in about 5-10 years the positive
e¤ects of democratisation appear and become pronounced. It is expected
that the e¤ect will become stable in the medium run and long run. This
…nding supports the conclusion that positive e¤ects of political liberalisation
19on FD exist at least in the short run, as identi…ed in the previous panel data
study.
Figure 2 describes the standard deviation of the FD growth rate before
and after a stable democratisation for whole sample and subsamples. De-
mocratisation has led to a substantial rise in FD volatility for the whole
sample. Regional groups like Latin America (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) countries experience a higher volatility of …nancial development, but
Asian countries (ASIA) do not10. The standard deviations of the FD growth
rate in income groups, like low-income countries (INCLOW) and middle
income countries (INCMID), and legal origin groups, like British legal ori-
gin countries (LEG_UK) and French legal origin countries (LEG_FR), in-
creases after their democratic transition. An increase of FD volatility may
re‡ect the fact that the removal of institutional obstacles after democratic
transition could bring about short-run investment booms, re‡ected in a more
volatile FD growth rate.
6 Conclusion
This research studies the impact of political liberalisation on …nancial de-
velopment. It …rstly examines whether institutional improvement stimu-
lates …nancial development using a panel of 90 economies over the period
1960-99. By comparing newly developed panel data techniques, including
bias-corrected LSDV and system GMM estimators, this research shows that
improved institutional quality is associated with increases in …nancial de-
velopment at least in the short run, and this is particularly true for lower
income countries, ethnically divided and French legal origin countries. For
the lower income countries, this e¤ect is expected to persist over longer
horizons.
This research further conducts a “before-and-after” approach to address
whether signi…cant democratic transitions in terms of the establishment of
representative government are good for …nancial development. The within
10Largely, among Asian countries, the …nancial development performance as well as
other economic performance in East Asian and Paci…c countries are di¤erent from those
in South Asian countries.
20country comparisons reveal the heterogeneity of countries’ experiences of
…nancial development, which implies that further investigation into other
relevant factors should be worthwhile. The results also indicate that in
general democratic transitions are typically preceded by low …nancial de-
velopment, but followed by a short-run boost in …nancial development and
greater volatility of …nancial development. The increase of …nancial de-
velopment volatility is perhaps related to the immediate consequences of
democratisation which may introduce greater openness to trade and com-
petition, speed up growth, encourage investment and give more con…dence
over the economic environment being open, free and competitive.
The …ndings of this research highlight the in‡uence of political liberali-
sation on the supply side of …nancial development. They shed light on the
strong and robust relationship between institutional quality and economic
performance, and present further grounds for political reform.
The …ndings in the panel data study on the coexistence of the e¤ect of
political liberalisation, GDP and trade openness on …nancial development
are very signi…cant. Firstly, it enriches the evidence for an openness-…nance
nexus. Huang and Temple (2005)’s cross-section and panel data study sug-
gests that trade openness is very likely to boost …nancial development, for
whichinstitutional improvement couldserve as one channel. The IMF (2003)
indicates the possible existence of such a channel by concluding that “greater
openness to trade and stronger competition are conducive to institutional
improvement, and thus to growth”. However, the …ndings of this research
tend to suggest that there are additional channels via which more open poli-
cies exert a positive e¤ect on …nancial development. The …ndings are also
consistent with Rajan and Zingales (2003)’s claim that trade openness is
helpful for changing incumbents’ willingness to promote …nancial develop-
ment.
Secondly, it has implications for economic liberalisation and political
liberalisation. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) argue that “studying the ef-
fects of each reform (economic and political reform) individually can be
misleading” and there are positive feedback e¤ects and interaction e¤ects
between economic liberalisation and political liberalisation. They suggest
that “causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalisa-
21tion, rather than vice versa... we cannot rule out feedback e¤ects in both
directions.” The …ndings of this paper seem to be consistent with their …nd-
ings on the interaction e¤ects in the sense that political liberalisation under
an open economic environment exerts an additional boost to investment and
economic growth, and thus to …nancial development.
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25Table 1. Political liberalisation and financial development (whole sample) , 1960-1999
Dependent variable: FD_(it)                  OLS                   LSDV            LSDVC           SYS-GMM
FD_(i, t-1) 0.951 0.863 0.379 0.320 0.825 0.796 0.689 0.848
[0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.00]***
POLIT_( i, t-1) 0.015 0.015 0.025 0.026 0.018 0.020 0.080 0.028
[0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.05]** [0.19] [0.15] [0.03]** [0.05]**
LGDP_( i, t-1) 0.133 0.013 1.232 1.179 0.655 0.567 0.466 0.048
[0.02]** [0.85] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.02]** [0.04]** [0.20] [0.74]
OPENC_( i, t-1) 0.159 0.273 1.818 1.912 1.214 1.470 2.195 0.500
[0.53] [0.31] [0.01]*** [0.02]** [0.05]** [0.06]* [0.17] [0.31]
BMP_( i, t-1) -0.240 -0.089 -0.050 -0.236
[0.00]*** [0.45] [0.73] [0.02]**
CI_( i, t-1) 2.372 0.798 0.755 2.785




Diff-Sargan  (p-value)² 0.18 0.89
LR effect point estimate³ 0.306 0.110 0.041 0.038 0.102 0.099 0.256 0.187
(Standard error) [0.39] [0.06]* [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.08] [0.07] [0.23] [0.17]
Observations 233 220 233 220 233 220 233 220
Notes:  82 countries. P-value is reported in brackets below point estimates. Year dummies included in all models. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The LSDVC estimator is the corrected LSDV estimator developed by Kiviet (1995) for finite sample bias and contructed for dynamic unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005). The SYS-GMM results 
are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics; the standard errors are based on the finite sample adjustment of Windmeijer (2005).  
¹ M1 and M2 are tests for null of no first-order and no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically N(0,1). 
² Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for GMM estimators, asymptotically ?². Diff-Sargan tests the null of mean stationarity for the system GMM estimator.
³ LR measures the long-run effect of political liberalisation on financial development. Its standard error is approximated using the delta method.Table 2. Political liberalisation and financial development (lower income countries), 1960-1999
Dependent variable: FD_(it)                  OLS                   LSDV            LSDVC           SYS-GMM
FD_(i, t-1) 0.932 0.854 0.387 0.292 0.840 0.775 0.991 0.790
[0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.04]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]***
POLIT_( i, t-1) 0.012 0.009 0.044 0.048 0.030 0.032 0.049 0.027
[0.11] [0.25] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.04]** [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.04]**
LGDP_( i, t-1) 0.128 0.049 0.662 0.659 0.249 0.245 0.238 0.255
[0.05]* [0.49] [0.03]** [0.04]** [0.35] [0.29] [0.52] [0.13]
OPENC_( i, t-1) -0.297 -0.348 1.676 1.412 1.177 1.123 0.603 0.363
[0.33] [0.26] [0.03]** [0.10]* [0.14] [0.18] [0.51] [0.63]
BMP_( i, t-1) -0.244 -0.123 -0.086 -0.223
[0.01]*** [0.26] [0.47] [0.04]**
CI_( i, t-1) 2.202 0.847 0.554 2.213




Diff-Sargan  (p-value)² 0.84 0.97
LR effect point estimate³ 0.180 0.064 0.072 0.068 0.186 0.142 5.454 0.13
(Standard error) [0.18] [0.05] [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.11]* [0.08]* [141.51] [0.09]
Observations 177 169 177 169 177 169 177 169
Notes:  57 countries. For other notes, please see Table 1.Table 3. Political liberalisation and financial development (ethnically diverse countries), 1960-1999
Dependent variable: FD_(it)                  OLS                   LSDV             LSDVC           SYS-GMM
FD_(i, t-1) 0.913 0.840 0.365 0.313 0.820 0.794 0.857 0.807
[0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]***
POLIT_( i, t-1) 0.017 0.018 0.026 0.025 0.020 0.021 0.055 0.034
[0.02]** [0.01]*** [0.04]** [0.07]* [0.16] [0.17] [0.11] [0.06]*
LGDP_( i, t-1) 0.144 0.045 1.193 1.148 0.585 0.501 0.378 0.206
[0.01]*** [0.51] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.03]** [0.08]* [0.18] [0.11]
OPENC_( i, t-1) 0.333 0.388 1.879 1.959 1.318 1.529 1.447 0.816
[0.17] [0.12] [0.01]*** [0.02]** [0.06]* [0.07]* [0.21] [0.14]
BMP_( i, t-1) -0.237 -0.091 -0.055 0.218
[0.00]*** [0.44] [0.67] [0.01]***
CI_( i, t-1) 1.894 0.458 0.530 1.304




Diff-Sargan  (p-value)² 0.73 0.61
LR effect point estimate³ 0.200 0.115 0.041 0.036 0.109 0.103 0.384 0.175
(Standard error) [0.15] [0.06]** [0.02]** [0.02]* [0.08] [0.08] [0.69] [0.159]
Observations 220 211 220 211 220 211 220 211
Notes:  67 countries. For other notes, please see Table 1.Table 4. Political liberalisation and financial development (French legal origin countries) , 1960-1999
Dependent variable: FD_(it)                  OLS                   LSDV            LSDVC           SYS-GMM
FD_(i, t-1) 0.763 0.721 0.214 0.214 0.708 0.694 0.848 0.709
[0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.10]* [0.12] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]***
POLIT_( i, t-1) 0.018 0.020 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.032 0.038 0.042
[0.12] [0.07]* [0.11] [0.08]* [0.12] [0.14] [0.11] [0.04]**
LGDP_( i, t-1) 0.144 0.042 0.643 0.572 0.294 0.155 0.319 0.129
[0.04]** [0.63] [0.06]* [0.12] [0.47] [0.65] [0.10]* [0.51]
OPENC_( i, t-1) 0.468 0.755 2.691 2.110 2.421 1.997 0.522 1.250
[0.23] [0.04]** [0.01]*** [0.06]* [0.03]** [0.07]* [0.48] [0.12]
BMP_( i, t-1) -0.185 -0.135 -0.088 -0.135
[0.01]*** [0.35] [0.61] [0.06]*
CI_( i, t-1) 1.836 1.110 1.558 1.445




Diff-Sargan  (p-value)² 0.51 0.95
LR effect point estimate³ 0.075 0.070 0.034 0.038 0.094 0.104 0.251 0.144
(Standard error) [0.05] [0.04]* [0.02] [0.02]* [0.06] [0.08] [0.27] [0.12]
Observations 153 150 153 150 153 150 153 150
Notes:  49 countries. For other notes, please see Table 1.Table 5. Change in FD standardised before and after democratization
Countries Democratization 
year before10 after10 d10 before5 after5 d5
Argentina 1983 -0.375 -0.466 -0.092 -0.266 -0.723 -0.457
Bolivia 1982 -1.055 -0.789 0.266 -1.000 -1.397 -0.396
Brazil 1985 -0.492 -0.341 0.151 -0.492 -0.610 -0.118
Chile 1989 -0.136 -0.507 -0.371 -0.138 0.040 0.178
Dominican Rep. 1978 -0.527 -0.351 0.176 -0.337 -0.311 0.027
Ecuador 1979 -0.674 -0.486 0.188 -0.629 -0.451 0.178
Ethiopia 1994 -0.562 -0.615 -0.053 -0.547 -0.458 0.090
Ghana 1996 -1.295 -1.042 0.252 -1.256 -0.969 0.288
Grenada 1984 0.247 0.635 0.388 0.232 0.256 0.024
Guatemala 1986 -0.569 -0.411 0.157 -0.645 -0.532 0.114
Honduras 1980 -0.199 -0.278 -0.079 -0.142 -0.252 -0.110
Hungary 1989 -0.631 -0.335 0.296 -0.584 -0.323 0.261
Korea, Rep. 1987 0.307 1.031 0.724 0.482 0.874 0.393
Lesotho 1993 -0.300 -0.266 0.034 -0.572 -0.364 0.208
Madagascar 1991 -0.942 -0.460 0.483 -0.983 -0.808 0.176
Mexico 1994 -0.592 -0.367 0.224 -0.404 -0.138 0.267
Mali 1992 -0.625 -0.532 0.093 -0.625 -0.559 0.066
Malawi 1994 -0.814 -0.737 0.078 -0.840 -0.783 0.056
Nicaragua 1990 -0.342 -0.548 -0.206 -0.667 -0.757 -0.090
Nepal 1990 -0.735 -0.657 0.077 -0.745 -0.506 0.239
Pakistan 1988 -0.224 -0.266 -0.042 -0.186 -0.231 -0.045
Panama 1989 0.142 0.035 -0.106 0.093 0.039 -0.054
Peru 1979 -0.300 -0.351 -0.051 -0.230 -0.433 -0.203
Philippines 1986 -0.003 -0.113 -0.110 0.034 -0.363 -0.396
Poland 1989 -0.398 -0.167 0.230 -0.610 -0.319 0.291
Paraguay 1989 -0.467 -0.588 -0.121 -0.588 -0.471 0.117
El Salvador 1982 -0.685 -0.740 -0.055 -0.724 -0.876 -0.151
Suriname 1987 0.036 -0.110 -0.146 0.221 0.405 0.184
Seychelles 1993 -0.299 0.029 0.328 -0.275 -0.128 0.148
Thailand 1978 -0.193 0.903 1.096 -0.132 0.048 0.181
Uruguay 1985 -0.145 -0.523 -0.378 0.246 -0.419 -0.666
South Africa 1994 0.453 0.514 0.061 0.434 0.562 0.128
Zambia 1991 -0.926 -1.341 -0.415 -0.926 -1.349 -0.423
Average 0.093 0.015
1st Quartile -0.092 -0.110
Median Value 0.077 0.090
3rd Quartile 0.230 0.181
Note: The "before10" or "after10" is the average of FD standardized 10 years before or after transition. The "d10" is the difference 
between the two. This applies to "before5", "after5" and "d5". The FD standardised measure is the FD measure divided by  
cross-country standard deviation of FD in 1999.Appendix Table 1. The variables
Variable Description Source
FD Index for financial development in this paper, mainly 
measuring the size of financial intermediary 
development. It is the first principal component of 
LLY, PRIVO and BTOT.
LLY Liquid Liabilities, the ratio of liquid liabilities of 
financial system (currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and nonbanks) to GDP.
Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDS) in 
World Bank, 2005
PRIVO Private Credit, the ratio of credits issued to private 
sector by banks and other financial intermediaries to 
GDP.
FDS, 2005
BTOT Commercial-central Bank, the ratio of commercial 
bank assets to the sum of commercial bank and 
central bank assets.
FDS, 2005
POLIT The index for the degree of democracy. It is the 
"polity2" in PolityIV Database.
PolityIV Database        
Marshall et al. (2003)
LGDP Real GDP per capita (Chain) in log. Penn World Table 6.1
OPENC The sum of exports and imports over GDP (at current 
prices). The regression uses log(1+OPENC/100).
Penn World Table 6.1
CI The sum of investment over real GDP per capita 
(using domestic prices). The regression uses CI/100.
Penn World Table 6.1




INCLOW Dummy for low income group GDN, 2002
INCMID Dummy for middle income group, made up of lower-
middle income and low income countries
GDN, 2002
ETHFRAC Dummy for ethnic fractionalisation GDN, 2002
LEG_UK Dummy for British legal origin GDN, 2002
LEG_FR Dummy for French legal origin GDN, 2002
LEG_GE Dummy for German legal origin GDN, 2002
LEG_SC Dummy for Scandivanian legal origin GDN, 2002
ASIA Dummy for Asian countries GDN, 2002
LAC Dummy for Latin American countries GDN, 2002
SSA Dummy for Sub-Sarahan African countries GDN, 2002